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A Municipality's Interest in an Electrical Power 
Generating Facility: Some Tax Considerations 
The ever-increasing capital required to produce and supply 
electrical energy has made it attractive for two or more utilities 
to invest in a commonly owned installation.' Municipally owned 
utilities are no exception, as evidenced by the proposed Warner 
Valley Project in southern Utah. The City of St. George, Utah, is 
negotiating with the City of Los Angeles and the Nevada Power 
Company to unite in the construction of a coal-fired power plant 
in Warner Valley, Washington County, Utah. The plant would 
supply electrical energy to the areas serviced by the participants 
in the project. Although the final documents are as yet unsigned, 
the Warner Valley Project has raised some interesting tax issues. 
As municipal corporations owning public utilities struggle to 
cope with the energy shortage and seek to provide their residents 
with a sufficient supply of electrical energy at  the most reasona- 
ble cost, the questions to be illuminated in this Comment will 
inevitably surface in many jurisdictions. While this Comment 
will be couched in the framework of Utah constitutional and stat- 
utory law, its analysis and conclusions will have application to 
similar municipal interests in the many jurisdictions with compa- 
rable constitutional and statutory  provision^.^ To enable discus- 
sion of the pertinent issues, the following project arrangement 
will be assumed: 
(1) The participants are St. George, Utah, Los Angeles, Cali- 
fornia, and Nevada Power Company, a Nevada corporation. 
(2) The project will be located outside of St. George but 
within Washington County, Utah, on federal land presently ad- 
ministered by the Bureau of Land Management. The site will be 
leased from the government for a ninety-nine-year period with the 
three participants owning the electrical generating plant and ac- 
companying improvements. 
(3) The three participants will be tenants in common in the 
following percentages: Nevada Power, twenty-five percent; Los 
Angeles, fifty percent; and St. George, twenty-five percent. 
(4) The costs of operation and the electrical energy produced 
will be shared by the participants in proportion to their ownership 
interests. 
1. Kern, h b l i c  Utility Tax Partnerships, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 77, 77 (1973). 
2. For a listing of states with similar laws see note 11 infra. 
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(5) The cities of Los Angeles and St. George will distribute 
their portions of the generated power only to their residents. Any 
revenue collected above costs will be utilized for other municipal 
activities. 
(6) St. George's interest will be financed by the issuance of 
revenue bonds secured only by the city's interest in the project. 
This Comment will not consider the issue of whether a mu- 
nicipality has power to engage in such a joint enterprise. Nor will 
it discuss the taxability in Utah of Nevada Power, a private for- 
eign ~orporation.~ Discussion is limited to the question of whether 
the State of Utah through its political subdivision, Washington 
County, has the authority to tax the interests of St. George, a 
domestic municipality, or of Los Angeles, a foreign m~nicipality.~ 
Discussion will center on two distinct taxes: (1) an ad valorem 
tax,5 which would be levied directly on the generating plant and 
accompanying improvements; and (2) a use tax,%hich would be 
levied on the municipalities on the basis of their possessory lease- 
hold interests in the otherwise tax-exempt federal land. 
A. Background 
Property taxation is the general rule and exemption is the 
exception.' Courts strictly construe exemption provisions and are 
reluctant to extend them by impli~aton.~ Some exemption provi- 
3. Private Utah utilities are not immune from taxation. E.g., State ex rel. Public 
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938). Foreign corporations 
may not transact business on conditions more favorable than those prescribed for domestic 
corporations. UTAH CONST. art. 12, 8 6. Since property of domestic private utilities is 
taxable, property located in Utah but owned by foreign private utilities must be taxable 
as well. 
4. The Warner Valley issues will likely be subjected to litigation because of the 
uncertainty as to the taxability of St. George's interest and the large amount of tax 
revenues in question. The Kaiparowits Project, never completed because of environmental 
concerns, was similar to the Warner Valley Project and was expected to increase property 
tax revenues by as much as $42.4 million. Salt Lake Tribune, Dec. 5, 1974, at B-1, col. 2. 
5. An ad valorem tax refers to a tax or duty upon the value of the property. BLACK'S 
LAW D I ~ O N A R Y  58 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
6. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra. 
7. See, e.g., Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 227, 234, 487 P.2d 
1272, 1277 (1971) (quoting Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 337, 64 P. 961, 961 (1901)). 
The Utah Constitution provides: "All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in propor- 
tion to its value . . . ." UTAH CONST. art. 13, 8 2. 
8. See, e.g., Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95,103 (1937); Great 
Salt Lake Minerals & Chems. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337,340 (Utah 1977). 
The burden is generally on the claimant to establish a right to the exemption. Friendship 
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sions, however, are not usually subject to strict construction. This 
is especially true of provisions exempting publicly owned prop- 
erty where the presumption favors exemption and the burden is 
upon the government to establish the taxability of the property 
it seeks to reach? Construction and interpretation of the Utah 
exemption provision therefore becomes critical in determining 
the tax status of property held in Utah by municipalities, both 
foreign and domestic. 
B. Utah Exemption Rovision 
lic 
ad 
Utah's self-executing constitutional provision10 exempts pub- 
property from ad valorem taxation in the following words: 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt . . . shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value . . . . The property of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations 
and public libraries, lots with buildings thereon used exclusively 
for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of 
burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit, shall be 
exempt from taxation.ll 
Two separate tests are used in determining exemption from 
valorem taxation under this constitutional provi- 
sion-ownership and use. The test for exemption of municipal 
Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 227, 239, 487 P.2d 1272, 1280 (1971). 
9. City of Cheyenne v. Board of County Comm'rs, 484 P.2d 706,708-09 (Wyo. 1971). 
See also 16 E. MCQLJILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Q 44.58 (rev. 3d ed. 1972). 
10. A provision is self-executing when it is effective without the aid of ancillary 
legislation. "[P]ublic property used exclusively for any public purpose, shall be exempt 
from taxation . . . ." MINN. CONST. art. 10, Q 1 (emphasis added). A provision is not self- 
executing if its terms indicate it is not to become operative without enabling or supple- 
mental legislation. "The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation all public 
property . . . ." GA. CONST. art. 7, Q 1 (emphasis added). 
11. UTAH CONST. art. 13, Q 2. At least thirteen other states have adopted similar 
constitutional exemption provisions. See, e.g:, Alabama-ALA. CONST. art. 4, Q 91; 
Arizona-ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, Q 2; Colorado-COLO. CONST. art. 10, Q 4; Idaho-hmo 
CONST. art. 7, Q 4; Missouri-Mo. CONST. art. 10, Q 6; Nebraska-Nm. CONST. art. 8 ,8  2; 
New Mexico-N.M. CONST. art. 8, Q 3; North Carolina-N.C. CONST. art. 5, 8 2; North 
Dakota-N.D. CONST. art. 11, Q 176; Oklahoma-OKU. CONST. art. 10, Q 6; South Da- 
kota-S.D. CONST. art. 11, Q 5; Virginia-VA. CONST. art. 10, Q 6; Washington-WASH. 
CONST. art. 7, Q 2. 
In addition, several other states have adopted similar statutory provisions. See, e.g., 
Hawaii-HAW. REX. STAT. Q 49-11 (1976); Illinois-Revenue Act of 1939, 8 19.6, ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 120, Q 500.6 (1973); Montana-Mom. REV. CODES ANN. Q 84-202 (Cum. Supp. 
1977); Nevada-NEX. REV. STAT. Q 361.060 (1977); New Hampshire-N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. Q72:23 (Supp. 1977); Wisconsin-WIS. STAT. ANN. Q 70.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978- 
1979). 
The Utah Legislature enacted a statute using virtually the idenkcal wording as the 
constitutional exemption provision. UTAH CODE ANN. Q 59-2-1 (1953). 
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property is ownership. Although the word "own" is not used in 
the Utah constitutional provision, the requirement of ownership 
in connection with municipal property should be implied.12 The 
wording of the exemption provision, "property of the state, coun- 
ties, cities . . . and municipal ~orporations,"~~ connotes owner- 
ship. No requirement that the municipal property be put to any 
particular use is expressed. 
In contrast, the constitution provides an entirely different 
test for exempting religious or charitable property. Such property 
must be "used exclusively for either religious worship or charita- 
ble purposes."14 Under statutory and grammatical construction, 
the use requirement does not apply to municipal property, but 
only to property that would not be exempt except for its religious 
or charitable use. If the constitutional convention delegates, when 
exempting property of public entities, also intended to require 
that such property be "used" for public purposes, such require- 
ment most likely would have been express.15 
Utah case law supports the proposition that ownership by 
one of the enumerated public entities is the only requirement for 
exemption from ad valorem taxation. The case of Springville u. 
Johnson16 is one of the first and foremost expressions of Utah's 
policy regarding the exemption of public entities: "[Tlhe ex- 
emption from taxation of the property of cities is so clear and 
expressive that there would seem to be no room for any doubt, or 
necessity of resorting to any rule of construction. The exemption 
is absolute, and depends upon no condition but ownership by the 
city."n This view was reinforced in Duchesne County u. State 
Tax Commis~ion,~~ a case where no clear majority opinion pre- 
12. The word "owned" did appear in the territorial statute that was the predecessor 
to the present constitutional provision: "All property, real and personal, situate and being 
in this Territory, is taxable, except: . . . 3. Property owned by this Territory or any 
county, city, or school district." 1 COMP. LAWS OF UTAH § 2009 (1888). 
13. UTAH CONST. art. 13, Q 2. 
14. Id. (emphasis added). 
15. See generally City of San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal. App. 491, 509, 12 P. 
980, 987 (1915). 
16. 10 Utah 351, 37 P. 577 (1894). 
17. Id. a t  356, 37 P. at 578. The City of Springville, a municipal corporation, owned 
900 acres of land within its corporate limits from which it derived revenue by renting the 
property for pasturage. Taxes assessed against the land were not paid by the city and the 
land was sold to the defendant at a tax sale. The city sought toquiet t i tk¶%e court held 
that the city's leasing of the land for private purposes did not disturb the tax status of 
the property. The tax sale was void because ownership by the city was the only condition 
of exemption. Although the Springville opinion came down before Utah matured to state- 
hood in 1896, the effect of prior judgments was continued by article 24, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
18. 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943). 
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vailed. In Duchesne the state acquired land previously owned by 
private interests through foreclosure of mortgages the state had 
acquired from a state-owned trust. Upon acquisition by the state, 
the lands were removed from the tax rolls. The court addressed 
the contention of Duchesne County that the property should be 
reinstated upon the tax rolls because the state held the property 
in a proprietary capacity and the constitutional exemption provi- 
sion exempted only state property held in a governmental capac- 
ity. The plurality opinion noted that "[i]t is conceded that if the 
state holds title in its governmental capacity, the property is 
exempt from taxation under the constitutional mandate."lB The 
opinion then determined that the government could not hold land 
otherwise than in a governmental capacity, and, therefore, the 
land must be exempt from taxation. This reasoning was adhered 
to by only two of the five justices. The majority of the justices, 
in concurring separate opinions, found reference to the 
governmental-proprietary distinction unnecessary because mere 
ownership of the land by the state required a finding of exempt 
In 1976 the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of University 
of Utah v. Salt Lake County,21 reaffirmed its position that the 
constitutional exemption provision requires that property be 
owned by public entities to be exempt. The university leased 
property under a five-year lease with an option to purchase. The 
university was in possession and use of the property and had 
agreed to pay all taxes levied upon it. Such facts were not enough, 
the court held, to provide the university with legal title to the 
property. The property was not, therefore, owned by a subdivision 
of the state and was subject to taxation.22 
C. Exempt Entities 
In determining the taxability of the interests of Los Angeles 
and St. George in the Warner Valley electrical generating plant, 
discussion will center on whether the municipalities are included 
among the public entities specifically exempted and, if so, 
19. Id. at 372,140 P.2d at 338. 
20. Id. at 383-84, 140 P.2d at 343-44 (Wolfe, C.J., McDonough & Wade, JJ., separate 
concurring opinions). 
21. 547 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976). 
22. Id. at 208-09. Where ownership is the test, there seems to be little authority for 
the proposition that exemption should be limited to land held in a governmental capacity 
as opposed to a proprietary capacity. The property need not be put td a public use. 16 E. 
McQm~~rn, supra note 9, # 44.57. 
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whether they own the property within the meaning of the exemp- 
tion provision .23 
I .  St. George 
The City of St. George is organized and incorporated under 
the laws of the State of Utah. As such, St. George obviously is 
among the entities contemplated by the provision exempting 
from taxation the property of "cities . . . [and] municipal cor- 
poration~."~~ 
2. Los Angeles 
Because Los Angeles is a foreign municipality, whether or not 
its property interest is exempted under Utah's exemption provi- 
sion is not as easily determined. While no Utah cases are on 
point, the case of City Council v. Timmerman, 25 decided by the 
Fourth Circuit, is informative: 
Unless otherwise expressed, all legislation of a state relating to 
cities and towns refers to the cities and towns of that state, and 
not of another state or country. This is for the reason that the 
state has no control of cities and towns in other states, and from 
a governmental standpoint no interest in them. For a state to 
attempt to promote the development of cities and towns outside 
of its borders by exempting property owned by them from taxa- 
tion exacted of its own citizens would be so anomalous and 
contrary to legislative history and governmental policy that 
nothing but the clearest affirmative expression would warrant 
such an inference? 
23. There are two prevalent types of ad valorem tax exemption provisions. In some 
jurisdictions, ownership is the only test for exemption. Exemption in other jurisdictions 
is predicated upon the use to which the property is put as well as its ownership. For 
example, S.C. CONST. art. 10, Q 4 provides, "There shall be exempted from taxation all 
county, township and municipal property used exclusively for public purposes and not for 
revenue . . . ." In addition, the following states apply the use test for exemption: 
Arkansas-ARK. CONST. art. 16, 8 5; Delaware-DEL. CODE tit. 9, 4 8103 (1974); 
Florida-FLA. CONST. art. 7, Q 3; Indiana-h. CODE ANN. 5 6-1.1-10-5 (Bums 1978); 
Kentucky-KY. CONST. Q 170; Maine-ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, Q 651 (1964); 
Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, Q 9 (1975); Massachusetts-MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 59, Q 3A (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Michigan- MI^. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 211.7 
(Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Minnesota-Mm. CONST. art. 10, Q 1; New Jersey-N.J. STAT. 
ANN. Q 544-3.3 (West 1960); Oregon-OR. REV. STAT. Q 307,090 (1977); Texas-Tex. -  - . 
CONST. art. 11, 8 9; West Virginia-W. VA. CODE 8 11-3-9 (1974); WyominFWyo. CONST. 
art. 15, 5 12. 
24. UTAH CONST. art. 13, Q 2. 
25. 233 F. 216 (4th Cir. 1916). 
26. Id. a t  219. 
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Additional case law from other jurisdictions sustains the 
Timmerman concept. For instance, a waterworks plant owned by 
a Missouri municipality but located in Kansas was held to be 
taxable in Kansas.27 The Kansas Supreme Court declared that 
when a foreign municipality enters the realm of another state it  
does not carry with it any of the attributes of its sovereignty and 
is thereby subject to the laws of the state it enters just the same 
as any pr~pr ie tor .~~  An interstate toll bridge owned and operated 
by a Wisconsin municipality, but spanning the St. Croix River so 
that a portion of the bridge rested in Minnesota, was held to be 
taxable by the State of Minne~o ta .~~  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court's reasoning in State v. City of Hudson further clarified the 
law regarding taxation of foreign municipalities: "The public and 
sovereign character of the state owning property in another state 
ceases at the state line, with the consequence that its ownership 
of property in the foreign state is in its corporate capacity without 
any sovereign or public  attribute^."^^ 
The Utah Supreme Court would likely follow the established 
precedent of these other jurisidictions. Several policy arguments 
support this conclusion. To allow Los Angeles the same exempt 
status as St. George would be inequitable. The Warner Valley 
Project will create an immediate need for expansion of public 
services and facilities during its construction phase and will ex- 
tend that need throughout the life of the project, working hard- 
ships on local government already hard pressed to provide ade- 
quate coverage in those areas. While new residents brought to the 
area by the project will provide some tax revenue, the revenue 
will not provide the money necessary to adequately meet the 
27. State ex rel. Taggart v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251 (1911), appeal 
dismissed, 226 U.S. 599 (1912). 
28. Id. at 185, 116 P. at 253. 
29. State v. City of Hudson, 231 Minn. 127, 42 N.W.2d 546 (1950). But see City of 
Louisville v. Babb, 75 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 738 (1935), which 
also involved a toll bridge spanning a river into another stae. The district court had 
determined that the portion of the bridge located in Indiana was taxable by Indiana since 
the bridge was owned and operated by Louisville, Kentucky. The district court found 
unconstitutional a statute enacted by the Legislature of Indiana that specifically ex- 
empted "[alny bridge . . . when owned either by the State of Indiana . . . or by another 
state or by any municipality or political subdivision of such other state." Act of Mar. 11, 
1929, ch. 94, § 1, 1929 Ind. Acts 296 (current version a t  IND. CODE ANN. 4 6-1.1-10-3 (Burns 
1978)). The circuit court reversed. 
In a somewhat related case, land acquired and held for railway purposes by one state 
within the borders of another state was ruled to be subject to eminent domain by the state 
in which the land was located. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924). 
30. 231 Minn. 127,130,42 N.W.2d 546,548 (1950). See also Hall v. University of Nev., 
8 Cal. 3d 522,503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). 
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initial growth problems. Mobile home cities, proper waste treat- 
ment, adequate police protection, sufficient educational facili- 
ties, and construction and maintenance of roads are all challenges 
facing local officials. Solutions to these growth-related problems 
will require immediate and substantial capital outlay, primarily 
by Washington County. If the property of Los Angeles is held to 
be exempt from ad valorem taxation, revenues from the Warner 
Valley Project will not likely be sufficient to provide the capital 
outlay monies required by the accelerated growth. 
Adverse environmental effects are also legitimate concerns of 
county officials. Los Angeles will have a fifty percent ownership 
interest in the new generating facility and will be entitled to half 
the generated power, yet it will be immune from these related 
concerns. While taxing Los Angeles will not eliminate environ- 
mental problems, taxation will aid in finding solutions and reduc- 
ing inequities. The exemption provision of article 13, section 2 of 
the Utah Constitution should not be construed to include Los 
Angeles within the terms of the public entities exemption. 
D. The Question of Ownership3' 
Historically, the Utah Supreme Court has found the ad valo- 
rem tax exemption provision to be unambiguous and not open to 
constr~ct ion.~~ It has, therefore, exempted all municipal interests. 
Previous cases, however, have dealt with a municipality's owner- 
ship and control of the entire property;" the court has not yet 
been confronted with a municipality's minority interest. Where 
a municipality owns only a twenty-five percent interest in prop- 
erty under consideration, as will St. George, the exemption provi- 
sion may be subject to construction. 
I .  Implications from another ownership jurisdiction 
Analysis of the taxability of St. George's minority interest 
may be benefited by case law from another jurisdiction. In Geor- 
gia, ownership has been the test for exemption from ad valorem 
31. Discussion under this section will be limited to the interest of the City of St. 
George. Any discussion relative to St. George's ownership interest would be equally 
applicable to the interest of h Angeles. Moreover, qualification of the interest of Los 
Angeles under the ownership requirement would be fruitless since Los Angdes, as a foreign 
corporation, would not be entitled to the ad valorem tax exemption provided for in the 
Utah Constitution. 
32. See, e.g., Springville v. Johnson, 10 Utah 351, 356, 37 P. 577, 578 (1894). 
33. See, e.g., Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 
(1943); Springville v. Johnson, 10 Utah 351, 37 P. 577 (1894). 
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taxation. All "public property" of that state has been exempted.:" 
An interesting concept was discussed by the Georgia Supreme 
Court in Cleveland u. Stewart.35 In dictum, the court stated: 
Another class of public corporations are those which are founded 
for public-although not political or municipal-purposes, and 
the whole interest in which belongs to the government. Thus, a 
bank, organized by the government for public purposes, is a 
public corporation if the whole of the stock and all the interest 
in it, reside in the g~vernment.~~ 
A subsequent Georgia Supreme Court decision implied that 
ownership of less than the entire property might result in taxation 
of that property. In Sigman u. Brunswick Port Authority, the 
court found the property of the port authority to be public prop- 
erty and exempt from taxation. In partial support of its finding, 
the court stated, "No private interest exists in the property of the 
Authority. The members thereof may not use it for private gain 
or income. "38 
The implication that a private interest in the property might 
result in taxation of otherwise exempt property deserves consider- 
ation. Applying this analysis to the Warner Valley Project, St. 
George's interest may not be "municipal" or "public" property 
exempt from ad valorem taxation since the city will not own the 
entire interest in the project. 
2. Comparison to federal tax concepts 
An examination of federal tax decisions provides additional 
information for evaluating St. George's exempt status. As a gen- 
eral rule, states are not taxable by the federal government; yet, 
when a state engages in business of a private nature, it may open 
itself to federal taxation. This principle is illustrated by South 
Carolina u. United States.39 South Carolina had engaged in the 
liquor business and the United States demanded payment from 
the state of license taxes imposed generally on all persons dealing 
in intoxicating liquors. The United States Supreme Court found 
that the state and its agencies were not exempted from the license 
tax. The state, by participation in private business, forfeited its 
34. GA. CODE ANN. 5 92-201 (1974). 
35. 3 Ga. 283 (1847). 
36. Id. at 291 (citations omitted). 
37. 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958). 
38. Id. at 335, 104 S.E.2d at 470-71 (emphasis added). 
39. 199 U.S. 437 (1905). 
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immunity from taxation.40 
Another argument against exemption of St. George's interest 
may, by analogy, be drawn from the Internal Revenue Code. For 
federal tax purposes, "a joint undertaking merely to share expen- 
ses is not a partner~hip."~~ The parties are taxed as separate 
entities. However, when more than simple coownership and cost- 
sharing is involved, an agreement becomes a partnership for in- 
come tax purposes regardless of the intention of the parties." In 
Revenue Ruling 68-344," four utilities owned undivided interests 
in an electrical generating facility, shared costs of operating the 
facility, and also shared the electrical energy generated by it. The 
Internal Revenue Service took the position that for federal income 
tax purposes the utilities had gone beyond a mere sharing of costs 
and had entered into a partnership. 
Applying that ruling to the instant situation, it may be rea- 
soned that by entering into such an undertaking with undivided 
interests, the participating utilities become a partnership for tax 
purposes. It is doubtful that tax immunity would be extended to 
the partnership. 
3. firpose of the exemption provision 
A look at the underlying rationale of the exemption provision 
may be helpful in determining the breadth and scope of the mu- 
nicipal immunity provision. Shortly after Utah's municipal im- 
munity provision was adopted, three basic policies embodied in 
tax immunity provisions were isolated: first, a desire to prevent 
governmental functions and activities from being interfered with 
or impeded; second, a desire to avoid the useless formality of 
permitting the government to tax itself; and third, a desire to 
alleviate the problems of enfor~ernent.~~ Application of these poli- 
cies to the present case may provide justification for exempting 
St. George's interest in the Warner Valley Project from taxation. 
First, taxing St. George's interest would have an effect on the 
interest rate of the revenue bonds to be acquired. In that limited 
sense, the activities of St. George would be impeded. In addition, 
the revenue bonds areeto be secured solely by the interest in the 
property itself and revenues generated; no tax monies are to be 
used. As ad valorem taxes are assessed directly against the prop- 
- -- 
40. Id. at 463. 
41. Treas. Reg. Q 1.761-l(a) (1956). 
42. Kern, supra note 1, at 79. 
43. Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569. 
44. 0. POND, LAW OF PUBLIC U m m  8 404 (3d ed. 1925). 
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erty, any unpaid tax assessed would result in a claim against the 
property.45 Second, considering the sovereign state as a whole, for 
one political subdivision to tax another would mean that money 
taken from one pocket would be put into another. The costs of 
administering the tax make it economically impractical to im- 
pose since no benefit accrues to the state as a whole. Finally, the 
problem of enforcement may also have an effect on the taxability 
of St. George's interest. The remedy for unpaid taxes is to satisfy 
the tax lien by a sale of the property or interest upon which the 
tax is due.46 Any unpaid assessment would not result in liability 
to the city or require payment by tax monies." A tax sale could, 
however, result in the property interest falling into outside hands, 
thereby increasing electrical costs to the residents of St. George.4n 
Many changes in governmental functions have occurred 
since the turn of the century, however, when the above municipal 
immunity policies were propounded. Modern notions as to the 
extent of municipal functions were likely not foreseeable to the 
framers of the state ~onst i tut ion.~~ An exemption similar to the 
present constitutional provision appeared in a territorial law -of 
1876." A constitutional provision permitting a municipality to 
own and operate a utility, however, was not added to the constitu- 
tion until 1933.51 Even if the framers intended municipally owned 
utilities generally to be exempt, clearly they could not have fore- 
seen a situation such as is presented by the Warner Valley Pro- 
ject. Electrical power was in its early stages of development. It is 
possible the framers did not intend to exempt such municipal 
property interests. Additionally, exemption of St. George's inter- 
est may not be realistic as exemption fails to recognize the dis- 
tinct interests of various subdivisions of the state. A substantial 
45. A tax debt creates a lien against the property assessed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10- 
3 (1953). 
46. UTAH CODE ANN. Q 59-10-33 (1953). 
47. A statutory sale of property removes a tax lien against it even if the proceeds of 
the sale are insufficient to satisfy the delinquent taxes assessed. San Juan County v. Jen, 
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 394, 401 P.2d 952 (1965). 
48. 0. POND, supra note 44, a t  8 864. Mr. Pond suggested: 
[TJhe motive and purpose of the municipality is to secure adequate and effi- 
cient municipal public utility service for its citizens at the most reasonable 
possible rate which is often in sharp contrast to the very natural attitude of the 
privately owned municipal public utility in its desire to receive the greatest 
possible return on its investment . . . . 
49. See generally South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 456 (1905). 
50. Utah territorial laws provided, "Property belonging to the United States, this 
Territory, or any county, city, or town thereof. . . are exempt from taxation." COMP. LAWS 
OF UTAH § 359 (1876). 
51. UTAH CONST. art. 11, § 5. 
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capital outlay will be required to cope with the population influx 
problems associated with the construction of the Warner Valley 
Project. Most of that capital outlay will come from Washington 
County, the situs of the project, with costs to be shared by county 
residents. All of St. George's electrical power allotment will go to 
the residents of St. George; other county residents will not receive 
the benefit of additional electrical power. To require county, resi- 
dents residing outside of St. George to share equally in the project 
costs without receiving the benefits of additional power casts 
upon them an inequitable burden. Taxing the interest of St. 
George would redistribute the tax burdens of county residents 
more in line with the benefits they receive. The benefit of an 
equal tax burden may outweigh other policies arguing for exemp- 
tion. 
4. Summary 
While LOB Angeles clearly becomes subject to ad valorem 
taxation when operating in Utah, there remains some question 
regarding St. George's tax status. There is a risk that a munici- 
pality strips itself of its tax immunity when it acquires a minority 
interest in a "partnership" entity. Furthermore, the inequities of 
the tax burden to be placed on county residents living outside the 
City of St. George and the uniquely modem nature of the project 
argue against the conclusion that St. George should receive the 
benefit of tax immunity for its interest in the project. The courts 
of Utah have declared, on the other hand, that the policy of the 
state is to exempt all publicly owned property. Ownership has 
been the only test." This policy of exempting property owned by 
municipalities is an obstacle not likely to be overcome.53 
III. USE AND POSSESSORY TAXES 
A. Background 
Although, under the M'Culloch doctrine, the land to be 
leased for the Warner Valley Project may not be taxed directly 
because it is owned by the federal g~vernment ,~~  the use or posses- 
52. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra. 
53. The courts will probably relegate any narrowing of fhewnership ~eqtliremee&to 
the legislature. 
54. Federal governmental immunity from state taxation was first enunciated in 
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Maryland's attempt to impose a 
tax on a federally created bank prompted Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted phrase: 
"[Tlhe power to tax involves the power to destroy." Id. at 431. Justice Marshall also 
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sion of the land by the project may be subject to taxation." A 
Utah statute,56 which has been held to be a constitutional limita- 
tion on the M'Culloch doctrine," provides for "a tax upon the 
possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any private individ- 
ual, association, or corporation of any property, real or personal, 
which for any reason is exempt from taxation, when such property 
is used in connection with a business conducted for profit."5x 
Although the tax is levied on use or possession, the amount of the 
tax is the same as an ad valorem property tax on the p r o ~ e r t y . ~ ~  
reasoned "that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, 
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
Congress." Id. at 436. Early applications of the M'Culloch immunity by courts were 
sweeping. See Note, The Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and its Effect upon 
Lessees of Federal Property, 21 U. Prrr. L. REV. 697,698 (1960). In recent years, however, 
federal immunity from state taxation has deteriorated, or a t  least has been circumvented. 
55. In 1953 Michigan, steering clear of state taxes directly on federal property itself, 
enacted legislation designed to tax the use of federal property in the hands of federal 
contractors. Act of June 10, 1953, Pub. Act 1953, No. 189, 5 1, 1953 Mich. Pub. Acts 252 
(codified a t  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $211.181 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)). The constitution- 
ality of that legislation was challenged in two significant 1958 Supreme Court cases. 
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), involved a private corporation's lease 
of property from the federal government. The Court held that private corporations were 
not shielded from state taxes even though part or all of the financial burden of the taxes 
eventually might fall on the government. The tax was levied upon the private lessee and 
not upon the government or its property. In a companion case, United States v. Township 
of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958), a private corporation used a manufacturing plant 
owned by the United States in performing several supply contracts the corporation had 
with the government. There was no formal lease and no rent was charged. The corporation 
used the plant under a terminable permit and agreed not to include any part of the cost 
of facilities furnished by the government in the price of goods supplied under the cost- 
plus-fixed-fee contracts. Again, the interest was held taxable by the state. After the 
Supreme Court affirmed the basic design of the Michigan tax, the way was open for other 
states to follow suit, which Utah quickly did. 
56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-73 (1953). 
57. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391 (1964). Thiokol, 
a company engaged in the research and development of the Minute Man missile under a 
cost-plus contract, was assessed over $125,000 in taxes for property in its possession that 
was owned by the United States. Contentions that the incidence of the tax fell upon the 
United States, that Thiokol had no taxable interest in the property, and that the statute 
was unconstitutional because it was both discriminatory and discriminatorily applied 
were not successful. Although the court did find that the statute had not been applied to 
state-owned property, it concluded that the statute was not intentionally misapplied and, 
hence, not discriminatory against Thiokol. Id. at 361, 393 P.2d a t  395-96. 
The major difference between the Utah tax and the Michigan tax after which it was 
patterned is that Utah's applies to the use of both real and personal property, unlike the 
Michigan tax, which applies to the use of real property only. The following statutes tax 
the use or possession of exempt property: Michigan-MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.181 
(Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Nevada-NEV. REV. STAT. $ 361.157, .I59 (1977); U tah -u~A~  
CODE ANN. 8 59-13-73 (1953). 
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-73 (1953). 
59. Id. 59-13-74. 
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In contrast to ad valorem taxes, however, no lien attaches to the 
property upon assessment of use taxes," though failure to pay the 
tax results in a debt due the county.61 
B. Use Tax Provisions 
The use tax provisions of the Utah Code delineate four basic 
prerequisites to taxation." The property must be: (1) possessed 
or beneficially used; (2) exempt from taxation; (3) enjoyed by a 
private individual, association, or corporation; and (4) used in 
connection with a business conducted for profit." The first two 
requirements may be dismissed summarily as being satisfied in 
the present case. The leasehold interests of St. George and Los 
Angeles in the federal lands are possessory and unquestionably 
beneficial to each. Additionally, the property of the federal gov- 
ernment upon which the project is situated is not subject to ad 
valorem taxation." Remaining for consideration are the last two 
requirements. If it is determined that St. George and Los Angeles 
are "private" corporations for the purposes of the Warner Valley 
Project and use the property in connection with a business con- 
ducted for profit, the municipal interests will be taxable by the 
state and its subdivisions. 
1.  Private? 
It must first be determined whether the municipalities of Los 
Angeles and St. George become private entities when operating 
an electrical generating plant. Los Angeles takes a private status 
upon entering Utah because a municipality is universally consid- 
ered private in a foreign state." For different reasons, under the 
Utah use tax statute St. George may also be considered private 
in its role in the Warner Valley Project. 
The Utah use tax specifically applies to private corporations. 
Municipal corporations are not commonly thought to be private. 
60. Id. 5 59-13-75. 
61. Id. 5 59-13-76. 
62. Section 59-13-73 levies a tax on the use or possession of property; it does not levy 
an ad valorem tax directly against the property itself. Article 13, 6 2 of the Utah Constitu- 
tion exempting "property o f .  . . cities [and] municipal corporations" does not apply to 
use taxes because the constitutional exemption provision applies only to ad valorem taxes. 
See State Tax Comm'n v. City of Logan, 88 Utah 406,415-177547.2d 1197~f201-02TI936R 
16 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, 8 44.57. For a detailed history and analysis of 8 59-13-73, 
see Note, The Utah Tax on the Use of Tax-Exempt Boperty, 9 UTAH L. REV. 415 (1964). 
63. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 59-13-73 (1953). 
64. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958). 
65. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra. 
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A distinction between the two terms is made in another tax stat- 
ute aimed at  certain corporations "whether the corporations are 
municipally or privately owned."66 Legislative use of the term 
"private corporations" and exclusion of the term "municipal cor- 
porations" from the use tax provisions may manifest an intent by 
the legislature to exempt municipal corporations from taxation. 
It should not be concluded, however, that a municipality can 
never be considered private. The governmental-proprietary dis- 
tinction" that has arisen mainly in the area of tort liability pro- 
vides a useful basis for determining when, if ever, a municipality 
is functioning in a private capacity for tax purposes." Proprietary 
in nature, in tort law, is equivalent to private in nature? Conse- 
quently, if the governmental-proprietary distinction is applicable 
66. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 59-15-4(b)(1) (1953) (emphasis added). 
67. For a concise history of the emergence of the governmental-proprietary distinc- 
tion, see Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 365,140 P.2d 335 (1943). Every 
jurisdiction but South Carolina and Florida has accepted the distinction between 
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions. Davis v. Provo City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 244, 
247 n.1, 265 P.2d 415, 417 n.1 (1953); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, a t  979 (4th 
ed. 1971). 
68. In the United States, governmental entities have generally been subject to tort 
liability when performing proprietary functions, but immune when performing govern- 
mental functions. W. PROSSER, supra note 67, a t  978-80. The trend, however, is away from 
tort immunity; in fact, there is a steady march to eliminate it  altogether. In Jivelekas v. 
City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976), the court defined sovereign or governmental 
immunity as the "principle [that] holds that the state, its subdivisions and municipal 
entities may not be held liable for a tortious act perpetrated while engaged in a govern- 
mental function." Id. a t  425 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Rose in writing 
the majority opinion advocated the abolishment of governmental immunity; the two other 
justices dissented as to that issue but eventually concurred in Oroz v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978). The Wyoming Supreme Court in Oroz completely 
abrogated governmental immunity from tort liability in that state. In following the trend 
away from immunity, the court cited the appendix to Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 
P.2d 1153 (1975), which indicated that 30 states, as of Mar. 30, 1973, had completely or 
partially abolished immunity. The Wyoming court noted that other states had taken 
action since the Hicks opinion, raising to 36 the number of states following the trend. 575 
P.2d a t  1157. 
The appendix in Hicks is not entirely correct. It incorrectly lists Utah as a jurisdiction 
having abolished governmental immunity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1978) pro- 
vides, "Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a govermental function 
9,  
. . . .  
The New Mexico Supreme Court, following the trend away from immunity, noted 
that it had "long recognized that the doctrine [of immunity] is not applicable to munici- 
palities when engaged in a proprietary function," and then proceeded to abrogate immun- 
ity when engaged in a governmental function. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 590,544 P.2d 
1153, 1155 (1975). 
69. In wrestling with the governmental-proprietary character of municipalities, the 
courts have equated "proprietary" capacity with "private" or "corporate" capacity. W. 
PROSSER, supra note 67, at 977-78. 
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to the Utah use tax provisions and St. George's interest in the 
Warner Valley Project is ruled to be proprietary in nature, St. 
George's interest in the project will meet the private enjoyment 
requirement of the use tax provision. There are reasons to believe 
that the Utah Legislature, cognizant of the governmental- 
proprietary distinction, could have intended to tax municipalities 
functioning as utilities. 
Under the governmental-proprietary test applied in Utah, 
St. George's interest in the project will probably be found to be 
proprietary. The state's Governmental Immunity Act specifically 
immunizes governmental entities "from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental f~nction."~" The fac- 
tors to be considered in determining whether a function is govern- 
mental or proprietary are: (1) whether the act is for the common 
good of the entire state and is generally regarded as a public 
responsibility, (2) whether there is any special pecuniary profit7' 
or corporate benefit to the city, and (3) whether it is of such a 
nature as to be in competition with free en te rpr i~e .~~ 
Application of these factors to the Warner Valley Project 
indicates that the project could be considered proprietary. The 
project is not for the benefit of the state at large, or even for the 
entirety of Washington County; it will furnish power to St. 
George only. Furnishing electrical power cannot be considered a 
public responsibility because private corporations also perform 
this function and the operation of utilities by municipalities is 
voluntary rather than compelled.73 Moreover, the city competes 
with private utilities and will receive revenue from the sale of 
electrical energy. Consequently, the city will definitely benefit 
from the facility. 
In addition to the above analysis, case law of neighboring 
states supports the classification of a public utility as proprietary 
in a taxation setting." And, importantly, the United States Su- 
preme Court has stated that "[ilt is no part of the essential 
70. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 63-30-3 (Supp. 1978). 
71. Cf. Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 764, 316 P.2d 265, 274 (1957) 
(special pecuniary profit test replaced with "commercial in nature" test). 
72. Compare Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) with Alder 
v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 569-71, 231 P. 1102, 1102-03 (1924). 
73. See UTAH CONST. art. 11, 8 5; UTAH CODE ANN. $ #-&-I4 (1953)- 
74. City of Phoenix v. Moore, 57 Ariz. 350, 113 P.2d 935 (1941); Town of Pine Bluffs 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262,333 P.2d 700 (1958). The Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized that an electrical utility is generally conceded to be proprietary in nature, 
noting, "'that in the operation and distribution of electrical power the City of Idaho Falls 
[was] acting in a proprietary capacity."' Hunke v. Foote, 84 Idaho 391, 396,373 P.2d 322, 
324 (1962) (quoting the trial court's finding). 
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governmental functions of a State to provide means of transporta- 
tion, supply artificial light, water and the like."75 
Utah's governmental-proprietary function test and case law 
from other jurisdictions provide strong arguments for treating the 
City of St. George as "proprietary" and, therefore, "private" for 
purposes of applying the use tax. to the city's interests in the 
Warner Valley Project. Doubts should be resolved in favor of 
taxation. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the use tax 
statute should be broadly interpreted to effectuate the purpose of 
its enactment, which was "to close any gaps in the tax laws by 
imposing a tax on any property possessed or used in connection 
with a business for profit which was otherwise exempt."" Sub- 
jecting municipalities such as St. George and Los Angeles to the 
use tax would not contravene the express language of the statute 
and would allow a "gap" in the tax laws to be closed. 
2. Business entered into for profit? 
St. George and Los Angeles might be able to avoid taxation 
under Utah's use tax provisions despite the conclusions drawn 
above if it can be shown that the Warner Valley Project is not a 
business entered into for profit. However, the determination that 
both municipalities play proprietary roles is nearly dispositive of 
the business for profit question as well. Satisfaction of the second 
prong of Utah's proprietary test requires a finding of special pecu- 
niary profit or corporate benefit; in fact, public utilities have been 
generally conceded to be competitive businesses for profit in those 
jurisdictions that have considered the question. 
The case against Los Angeles is even more conclusive than 
the one against St. George. Activities carried on by municipali- 
ties outside their native states are almost universally classified 
as businesses conducted for profit. For example, in City of Cin- 
cinnati v. Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves," the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals construed an income tax exemption for corporations not 
organized or conducted for pecuniary profit. The court conceded 
that while Cincinnati was not organized or conducted primarily 
for profit, it did have the expectation of pecuniary benefits in the 
particular activity of acquiring and conducting its railroad enter- 
prise. Therefore, it was not exempt from taxation on the income 
derived from the railroad enterprise. 
75. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911). 
76. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 358, 393 P.2d 391, 393 (1964) 
(emphasis added). 
77. 292 Ky. 597, 167 S.W.2d 709 (1942). 
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While the weight of analysis supports the conclusion that St. 
George and Los Angeles will be operating a business conducted 
for profit within the meaning of the use tax provisions, there is a 
Nevada Supreme Court ruling, based on a situation similar to 
that presented by the Warner Valley Project, reaching the oppo- 
site conclusion. However, the Nevada case is not controlling upon 
Utah courts and can, moreover, be attacked for faulty reasoning. 
Clark County v. City of Los Angele~'~ involved a power generating 
project operated by Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water Dis- 
trict of Southern California (MWD). The generators and related 
facilities were owned by the federal government, but, like Utah, 
Nevada had enacted legislation rendering taxable the lease or 
other use of exempt property.79 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Los Angeles and 
MWD were not engaged in a business for profit within the mean- 
ing of the statute because they were serving governmental needs.n') 
The justices reasoned that "[allthough the respondents obtain 
surplus funds, these are not distributed to private shareholders 
as dividends, nor are there private  shareholder^."^^ 
The flaw in the court's reasoning may be traced to a misap- 
prehension of the scope of three California casesE2 cited as support 
for the holding. The implication throughout those three cases is 
that to have a "profit" a private shareholder or individual must 
receive a benefit. The cases were decided under section 214 of the 
California Revenue and Taxation Codes3 which exempts nonprofit 
(religious, hospital, or charitable) corporations from ad valorem 
taxation?' Besides referring to an ad valorem rather than a use 
78. 91 Nev. 309, 535 P.2d 158 (1975). 
79. NEV. REV. STAT. # 361.157, .I59 (1977). 
80. The basic issue of the case was whether the rights to and use of hydroelectric 
generators and related facilities on the Nevada side of Hoover Dam by Los Angeles and 
MWD were subject to taxation by Nevada under its use tax. It was asserted in crossclaims 
filed against Clark County that taxation was not proper because "the State of Nevada 
had elected to receive annual payments of $300,000 from the Federal Bureau of Reclama- 
tion in lieu of any taxes by the State or its subdivisions, thereby 'preempting' the subject 
of taxation." Brief for Appellant at 3, Clark County v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Nev. 309, 
535 P.2d 158 (1975) (citation omitted). 
81. 91 Nev. at 312, 535 P.2d a t  160. 
82. Sutter Hosp. v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33, 244 P.2d 390 (1952); San 
Francisco Boys' Club, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 254 Cal. App. 2d 548, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
294 (1967); Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City of San Francis-coo 221 Cal.&p. 2d 336, 34 
Cal. Rptr. 376 (1963). 
83. (West Cum. Supp. 1978). 
84. Sutter Hosp. v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33, 35, 244 P.2d 390, 391 (1952); 
San Francisco Boys' Club, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 254 Cal. App. 2d 548, 549, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 294, 295 (1967); Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City of San Francisco, 221 Cal. 
App. 2d 336, 338, 34 Cal. Rptr. 376, 377-78 (1963). 
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tax, section 214 is separate and distinct from the state constitu- 
tional provisions exempting the property of cities and municipal- 
ities? Since municipal property is exempted elsewhere, section 
214 and cases decided under it need only focus on those corporate 
organizations that have shareholders. Wholesale application of 
the tests developed under section 214 of the California Revenue 
and Tax Code to cases under the Nevada use tax statute results 
in a comparison of apples and oranges.RB 
The precedential value of the Clark County case is easily 
outweighed by the authorities equating private and proprietary 
functions with businesses conducted for profit. A municipality 
should be considered as engaged in a business for profit under the 
use tax statute when it obtains surplus funds from a business that 
itself constitutes a proprietary function. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As municipally owned utilities seek to combat the energy 
shortage by combining their capital resources with other utilities 
85. The California Constitution provision provided that: 
In addition to such exemptions as are now provided in this Constitution, the 
Legislature may exempt from taxation all or any portion of property used exclu- 
sively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and owned by . . . corpora- 
tions . . . not conducted for profit and no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 
CAL. CONST. art. 13, 8 l c  (1879, repealed 1974, current version a t  art. 13, 8 4) (emphasis 
added). The first phrase of 8 l c  is critical to understanding the content and breadth of 
the provision. The property of cities and municipal corporations had been expressly ex- 
empted by § 1 of art. 13: "[Plroperty . . . such as may belong to this State, or to any 
county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this State shall be exempt from 
taxation . . . ." CAL. CONST art. 13, $ 1 (1879, repealed 1974, current version at art. 13, 8 
3). Since all municipal property was exempted elsewhere, 9 l c  refers to and is focused only 
upon corporations that have private shareholders or similar organizational structures. 
Consequently, it is understandable and even expected that the phraseology of the provi- 
sion be couched in nonmunicipal terms. There was no need to adopt construction or 
wording designed to include municipalities, which have no shareholders, because munici- 
palities had been previously expressly exempted. 
86. Unlike the situation in the California cases, municipalities were not expressly 
exempted elsewhere in the Nevada statutes at issue in Clark County. No indication, either 
express or implied, appeared in the Nevada statutes that municipalities were designed to 
be excluded from taxation. A "business conducted for profit" was not defined, nor did the 
statutes require on their face the existence of private shareholders or a distribution of 
dividends. The Nevada statutes were as conducive to an interpretation that municipalities 
acting in proprietary capacities should be included as businesses conducted for profit as 
to an interpretation that they should be excluded. In addition, the California provisions 
have reference only to ad valorem taxation while the Nevada statutes involve a tax on 
possession or use. The purpose, construction, and focus of 8 214 of the California Revenue 
and Taxation Code derived from 8 l c  of that state's constitution are not identical to those 
of the Nevada statutes. 
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in a commonly owned installation, the question of the taxability 
of municipal interests in public utilities will emerge. In jurisdic- 
tions where the use of the property also has significance for tax 
exemption purposes, the governmental-proprietary distinction 
will play a vital role. 
The breadth of the property and use tax statutes is the criti- 
cal issue to be resolved. Are Los Angeles and St. George exempt 
from the payment of an ad valorem tax levied directly upon the 
electrical generating plant itself and accompanying 
improvements? And, are their possessory leasehold interests in 
federal land exempt from use taxation? 
It appears certain that the property interests of Los Angeles, 
as a foreign municipality in Utah, will be subject to both ad 
valorem taxation and use taxation. The taxability of the interests 
of St. George, a domestic corporation, is a much more difficult 
question. 
St. George will not likely be subjected to an ad valorem tax 
on its interest in the electrical generating plant. Utah courts will 
probably find the policy of exempting publicly owned property an 
insurmountable obstacle and will construe the exemption provi- 
sion broadly to include any ownership interest. But, since the 
policy of tax exemption is generally confined to the area of ad 
valorem taxation, greater latitude is available to the courts in 
interpreting the use tax provisions. Since the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the use tax provisions of the Utah Code were 
enacted to close any gaps in the tax laws, it is likely the court will 
close a gap by finding St. George subject to the Utah use tax. 
Dale C. Hatch 
